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Abstract	
Relations	between	perceiving	and	knowing	are	well-worn	problems	that	become	visceral	
encounters	with	doubt	and	ambiguity	in	‘mixed-reality’	environments.	Locative	narrative	
situates	participants	within	stories	where	existent	places	function	as	the	setting.	Experiential	
confusion,	between	what	is	talked	of	as	real	and	as	imagined,	is	an	often-reported	
phenomenon.	Classical	pragmatisms,	and	more	broadly	the	writings	of	William	James,	
understand	the	functioning	of	the	body	to	be	for	the	production	of	action,	from	which	flows	
a	naturalistic	epistemology.	For	James,	a	thought’s	reference	to	an	object	occurs	in	the	
medium	of	an	‘experienceable	environment’	and	is	a	condition	of	it	being	known;	what	
something	is	known-as	is	how	it	functions	in	a	particular	context	and	the	consequences	that	
follow.	Contemporary	pragmatists	express	varying	positions	on	the	function	of	
representation	in	perception	at	different	levels	of	cognitive	awareness,	and	the	extent	to	
which	intentionality	is	derivative	of	linguistic	norms.	In	the	locative	narrative	iOS	application	
The	Lost	Index	No.1	–	Landscape	with	Figures	strategies	of	directing	participant	attention,	
movement,	cognitive	tasks	and	propositional	content	are	used	to	guide	the	interpretation	of	
events.	The	complex	environment	that	is	created	plays	with	the	multi-stability	of	perception	
and	the	‘multi-stability	meaning’	between	terms,	resulting	in	ambiguity	and	an	enhanced	
flexibility	of	interpretation.	
	
[Page	276]		
The	phone	rings	…	Listen	we	haven’t	got	long,	you	need	to	hear	this	…	sometime	ago	you	
were	a	volunteer	in	an	experiment	to	become	a	human	hard-drive	…	information	was	stored	
in	your	memory	…	while	you	have	no	recollection	of	this	event	the	material	now	needs	to	be	
retrieved	…	it	is	a	painless	procedure	…	For	the	good	of	others	and	yourself,	follow	these	
instructions	…	You	make	your	way	to	a	gallery	on	the	first	floor.	You	stand	in	the	corner	of	
the	room	and	look	down	at	your	phone.	First	you	notice	your	image	reflected	on	the	screen,	
and	then	another	face	emerges.	Looking	up,	you	are	standing	in	front	of	a	landscape	
painting.	The	voice	on	the	phone	again	…	‘You	are	going	on	a	journey’	…	your	
gaze	is	directed	from	the	gilt	frame	to	the	foreground	…	You	are	on	the	path.	A	dog	barks	at	
your	feet	…	geese	fly	low	towards	the	river	…	other	travelers	walking	ahead	…	passing	
onwards	and	arriving	at	the	entrance	to	the	church	you	twist	the	handle	and	enter	the	tower	
…	The	heavy	door	closes	behind	you	….	Eyes	adjusting	to	the	dim	interior,	you	begin	to	climb	
…	You	reach	a	room	…	On	the	floor	there’s	a	box	…	You	lift	the	lid	and	reach	inside	…	‘What	
do	you	find?’	There	seems	to	be	something	else	…	Retracing	your	journey	through	the	
landscape	you	come	to	the	frame	and	come	back	into	the	gallery.	You	are	back	in	the	
gallery.	Looking	at	the	phone	screen	you	are	prompted	to	input	the	data	retrieved	from	
your	memory.	
	
	
	
	
Figure	1:	Whittaker,	E.	&	Brocklehurst,	J.	R.	(2013),	‘The	Lost	Index	No.1.	–	Landscape	with	
Figures,	Version	1.0’	[iOS	Application].	
	
[page	277	original	article]	
	
In	Descartes’	Meditations	on	First	Philosophy	([1641]	2008:	AT	1:	19)	the	narrator	starts	
from	a	position	of	doubt:	Am	I	dreaming?	In	the	distance	the	tower	is	certainly	round	but	
approaching	he	sees	that	it	is	square.	A	piece	of	wax	held	in	the	hand	has	definite	qualities,	
yet	next	to	the	fire	its	shape	and	fragrance	are	altered.	How	can	we	trust	our	senses	when	
things	have	different	‘modes’	of	appearing?	([1641]	2008:	AT	2:	32)	Immediately	felt	
sensations,	he	states,	cause	nerves	to	travel	through	the	body	to	the	brain	that	are	
represented	as	‘ideas’	to	the	mind.	While	we	believe	our	ideas	correspond	to	the	
world	they	are	often	in	error.	Whereas	the	intellect	apprehends	ideas,	such	as	mathematics	
and	geometry	as	true,	independent	of	the	thinker.	Descartes	concludes	that	the	mind	is	of	a	
distinctly	different	nature	to	the	body.	
	
From	Descartes’	dualism	is	the	view	that	our	perceptions	are	representative	and	
misrepresentive	of	the	world,	and	that	the	content	of	hallucinations,	and	that	of	veridical	
perception,	is	a	mind-dependent,	subjective	experience	of	reality.	These	positions,	often	
categorized	as	‘The	Argument	from	Illusion’,	rest	upon,	A.	D.	Smith	(2002:	16)	argues,	an	
erroneous	identity	claim	–	that	the	content	of	perception	and	the	content	of	subjective	
experience	are	identical.	
	
Existent	objects	are	not	literally	what	is	in	our	head,	and	empirical	science	tends	to	frame	
the	‘transformation’	from	sensory	stimuli	to	perception	in	terms	of	an	intervening	
representation	consistent	with	the	Cartesian	dualist	‘idea’,	or	the	later	Russellian	‘sense	
data’	(Russell	1910:	181).	In	recent	neuroscience	research	in	auditory	perception,	Denham	
and	Winkler	(2015:	601)	find	that	associations	(below	the	level	of	awareness)	are	formed	
over	time,	between	incoming	sounds	and	persistent	‘mental	representations’.	Multiple	
sounds	heard	concurrently	are	distinguished	by	patterns	of	features,	‘schema’	that	are	
associated	with	types	of	sound	sources.	However,	they	argue	that	(2012:	79)	perception	is	
not	necessarily	a	stable	state.	In	auditory	streaming	experiments	switching	between	
interpretations	can	occur	when	listening	to	sequences	of	pure	tones.	This	phenomenon	
known	as	multi-stability,	is	analogous	with	the	experience	of	ambiguous	figures	such	as	the	
Necker	cube	or	Rubin	vase.	Its	function	is	posited	as	a	flexible	responsiveness	to	changing	
environmental	conditions.	
	
John	Searle’s	(1983:	18)	direct	realist	theory	of	perception	both	breaks	from	and	offers	
continuity	with	empirical	science.	His	stance	differs	from	the	disjunctivist	position,	which	
states	that	there	is	nothing	in	common	between	veridical	perception	and	hallucinations,	
holding	that	both	have	subjective	intentional	content	(what	thoughts	are	about).	In	Searle’s	
account	objective	objects	cause	perceptual	experiences	and	their	subjective	content,	in	this	
sense,	perceptual	experiences	are	‘casually	self-reflexive’	(2015:	5,	22).	A	naturalistic	
account	of	perceptual	processes	involves	representation	between	the	brain’s	objective	
tracking	of	the	environment	and	subjective	reporting	on	the	experience.	In	this	way	of	
talking,	perception	is	a	representation.	For	Searle	(2015:	19)	existent	objects	directly	cause	
objective	perception,	(‘world-to-mind’	‘direction	of	fit’),	and	cause	the	subjective	reference	
to	the	experience	itself	–	its	intentional	content	(‘mind-to-world’	‘direction	of	fit’).	
Intentionality	has	the	propositional	content	of	the	perception.	The	propositional	content	of	
intentional	states,	such	as	beliefs	and	desires,	may	or	may	not	‘match’	with	the	world.	The	
conditions	under	which	matching	is	‘satisfied’	occurs	in	relation	to	the	context	of	a	
‘Network’	(2015:	12,	36)	of	existent	beliefs	and	desires	and	‘Background	abilities’.	To	see	the	
pen	as	a	rollerball,	and	believe	it	writes	well,	requires	a	‘Network’	of	existent	ideas	and	
‘Background	abilities’	for	intentionality	to	be	satisfied.	Searle	(2015:	74,	90)	takes	‘all	
perception’	to	be	a	presentation	of	a	particular	instance	of	an	object:	the	paper	on	the	desk	
can	appear	white	and	in	the	afternoon	yellow.	Illusions,	he	says	after	Wittgenstein	([1958]	
1989:	Part	II,	xi,	194e),	are	‘seeing-as’,	a	way	of	talking	about	a	particular	[page	278	original	
article]	presentation	of	an	object.	
	
Pragmatist	Huw	Price	(2004:	78)	argues	that	object	naturalism	rests	on	the	assumption	that	
there	is	a	significant	‘“word-world”	semantic	relation’.	He	(2004:	75)	rejects	the	idea	that	
perceptual	experience	can	give	us	immediate	and	unprivileged	access	to	‘facts’,	‘data’	or	
knowledge	of	the	world,	on	the	grounds	that	our	experience	is	mediated	at	various	levels	of	
neurocognitive	processes,	within	and	outside	of	our	awareness.	The	sense	of	self	and	
thinking	occurs	within	sociocultural	public	language,	and	the	‘placement’	of	objects,	as	
objective	or	subjective,	is	not	determined	by	immediate	access	to	(Sellar’s)	‘the	given’,	but	
by	‘linguistic	behaviour’.	Robert	Brandom	(2011:	12,	26)	does	not	see	a	conflict	with	
scientific	explanations	of	representation	that	are	‘subpersonal’	–	cognitive	processes	that	
occur	beneath	the	level	of	awareness.	He	distinguishes	between	these	‘causal’	
representations	and	those	of	‘practical’	intentionality	–	abilities	that	are	skill-based	
adaptations	to	the	environment,	which	are	implicit	in	‘discursive’	intentionality	–	
‘normative’	rule-based	representations	with	propositional	content	that	occur	at	the	
‘personal’	level.	The	association	between	meaning	and	terms	in	natural	language	is	subject	
to	its	use.	
	
The	classical	pragmatism	(and	radical	empiricism)	of	William	James	(1912:	141)	does	not	
take	immediate	experience	to	be	unmediated1	or	for	terms	to	have	fixed	interpretations,2	
rejecting	the	notion	that	there	is	an	unqualified	correspondence	with	the	world.	James	also	
does	not	abandon	‘ordinary’	ways	of	talking;	rather	he	seeks	to	specify	discussion	of	
particular	perceptions	and	conceptions	according	to	how	they	function	in	particular	
contexts.	For	Price	(1998:	241)	deflationary	accounts	are	themselves	subject	to	linguistic	
norms.		
	
James	takes	‘immediate	acquaintance’	(1909:	47)	with	objects,	while	not	unmediated,	to	
yield	perceptual	knowledge,	however,	most	knowledge	is	about,	and	known	only	
symbolically	or	present	in	our	thoughts	intentionally	(as	intentional	content)	–	a	thought	of	
																																																						
1	“I,	for	my	part,	cannot	escape	the	consideration,	forced	upon	me	at	every	turn,	that	the	knower	is	not	simply	a	mirror	floating	with	no	foothold	anywhere,	and	passively	reflecting	an	order	that	he	comes	upon	and	finds	simply	existing.	The	knower	is	an	actor,	and	coefficient	of	the	truth	on	one	side,	while	on	the	other	he	registers	the	truth	which	he	helps	to	create.”	(James	[1878]	1920:	67)	
	
2		“[…]	subjectivity	and	objectivity	are	affairs	not	of	what	an	experience	is	aboriginally	made	of,	but	of	its	classification.	Classifications	depend	on	our	temporary	purposes	[…]”	(	James	[1912]	1922:	141)	
	
the	Eiffel	Tower	is	present	in	the	absence	of	the	object,	after	what	Brentano	refers	to	as	
‘intentional	inexistence’	(1909:	44).	To	know	is	the	potential	to	utter	propositions	that	are	
true	of	the	Eiffel	Tower.	Mental	‘pointing’	towards	the	concept,	through	a	sequence	
thoughts	and	their	motor	consequences,	that	if	carried	out	that	would	‘lead	harmoniously’	
(1909:	115)	–	be	incorporated	into	existing	beliefs	–	and	ultimately	arrive	at	an	ideal	or	real	
context	and	the	immediate	presence	of	the	tower.	How	can	the	contents	of	thoughts	be	
explained	by	pointing	towards	an	idea	without	already	containing	the	idea?	James	responds	
by	differentiating	between	knowing	that	is	verified	and	knowing	that	is	in	transit.	He	says	
that	we	are	‘virtual	knowers’	(1912:	68),	before	we	arrive	outside	the	tower	and	point	at	it.	
However,	we	may	never	visit.	Our	thought	may	never	get	beyond	the	virtual	stage	for	us.	
Our	thoughts	may	have	other	mental	or	physical	substitutes	that	lead	us	to	other	ideas	or	
practical	outcomes	(1909:	110).	Both	types	of	knowing	occur	in	the	medium	of	a	specific	
‘experienceable	environment’	(1909:	41).	We	know	things	by	the	practical	effects	they	have	
on	the	world.	We	can	say	an	object	is	‘known-as’	real	because	it	functions	as	a	real	pen,	
while	some	ideas	have	a	‘reality-feeling’	despite	being	vague	or	‘almost	unimaginable’	
(1902:	58).	
	
That	our	experience	can	give	us	direct	access	to	objective	objects	rather	than	normative	
ways	of	talking	about	objects	is	a	point	of	contention	between	pragmatists	(Hildebrand	
2014:	7)	[page	279	original	article].	James	says	we	do	not	know	to	what	degree	concepts	
affect	perception	and	to	what	extent	perceptions	affect	concepts.	
	
The	universal	and	the	particular	parts	of	the	experience	are	literally	immersed	in	each	other,	
and	both	are	indispensable.	(1911:	107)	The	potential	for	interpretation	to	ride	on	the	wave	
crest3	or	to	be	pulled	beneath	the	surface	and	reconfigured,	simulated,	counterfactually	
conjured	and	novel,	is	arguably	the	very	unfixity	and	‘flowing	over’	that	natural	language	
offers,	(even	within	Wittgenstein’s	[2009:	xi	347]	constraints	of	general	agreement).	An	
analogous	and	perhaps	reciprocal	relationship	can	be	talked	of	between	the	multi-stability	
of	meaning	between	terms	and	that	of	perceptual	multi-stability,	the	reporting	of	
appearances	that	appear	to	switch	between	interpretations	of	the	same	stimuli	under	the	
same	conditions.	
	
The	pen	lying	on	the	table	in	the	next	room	doesn’t	mark	this	paper.	Thoughts	or	
movements	towards	it	are	‘ambulatory’	([1878]	1920:	60)	relations;	they	occur	in-action,	in	
the	space	and	time	that	separates	my	concept	from	its	terminus,	the	existent	pen	I	pick	up.	
My	perception	‘hangs’	off	my	concept	in	‘a	concatenated	or	continuous	structure’	(1909:	
xii–xiii)	of	concrete	transitions.	Picking	it	up	and	pressing	down,	it	functions	for	me.	
However,	my	daydream	of	the	Eiffel	Tower	pen	I	once	owned	only	functions	in	the	domain	
of	my	thoughts.	I	tip	it	up	and	tiny	snow	falls	slowly	in	its	miniature	snowglobe	world.	
Scooping	up	the	snow,	I	hurl	it	against	the	glass.	Looking	down,	the	page	is	blank.	Many	
times	our	thoughts	are	not	terminated;	they	remain	in	transit,	flowing	towards	their	next	
effects.	
																																																						
3		‘We	live,	as	it	were,	upon	the	front	edge	of	an	advancing	wavecrest,	and	our	sense	of	a	determinate	direction	in	falling	forward	is	all	we	cover	of	the	future	of	our	path’	(James	1912:	69).	
	
	
Locative	narrative	can	be	defined	as	storied	audio	experiences	that	take	the	form	of	games	
or	drama.	Heard	on	headphones	and	set	in	‘real	world’	locations,	the	participant	moves	
simultaneously	in	the	physical	and	the	fictional	place.	The	confluence	of	ambient	and	
recorded	sound,	the	seen	and	the	described	and	the	observed	and	performed,	can	lead	to	
perceptual	ambiguity	and	shifts	in	perspective.	Experiential	confusion	between	the	existent	
and	the	imagined	is	an	often-reported	feature	of	these	‘mixed-reality’	(Milgram	and	Kishino	
1994)	environments.	Montola	et	al.	(2009	xxi)	describe	the	spatial,	temporal	and	social	
expansion	of	pervasive	game	worlds	that	blur	boundaries,	extending	the	concept	of	the	
‘magic	circle’	derived	from	game	theorists	Salen	and	Zimmerman	(2004)	and	Johan	Huizinga	
(1955	[1938]).	Reid	et	al.	(2005:	209)	describe	‘synthetic	confusion’	and	heightened	
experience	of	these	‘magic	moments’.	Benford	et	al.	(2006:	435)	discuss	‘blurring	the	frame’	
as	a	strategy	for	repositioning	behaviours	and	emotional	responses	in	fictional	and	real	
worlds,	drawing	upon	Gregory	Bateson	(1972)	and	Erving	Goffman	(1974).	
	
Introduced	at	the	top	of	the	paper,	the	science	fiction	locative	narrative	The	Lost	Index	No1:	
Landscape	with	Figures	(2013)	is	a	guided	imaginary	experience	in	binaural	sound,	set	in	
Plymouth	City	Museum	and	Art	Gallery4	and	accessed	via	headphones	and	an	iOS	app.		
	
The	participant	encounters	a	number	of	intersecting	contexts.	The	existent	museum	is	the	
place	where	the	experience	takes	place.	Launching	the	app	and	donning	headphones	signals	
that	it	is	‘non-serious’,	in	Searle’s	(1975:	320)	terms.	The	graphical	interface	declares	the	
science	fiction	genre.	Fictional	places	are	intersecting	and	nested:	the	museum	is	recast	as	a	
covert	location	of	unknown	agents;	the	phone	rings,	a	voice	emits	from	an	unspecified	
office;	a	[page	281	original	article]	landscape	depicted	in	a	painting	is	the	setting	for	the	
action,	moving	beyond	the	visual	depiction,	the	interior	of	church	tower	is	represented	in	
sound.		
	
James	(1890b:	293)	says	that	we	assign	objects	in	our	experience	to	different	categories	or	
‘worlds’:	the	physical	world	of	heat,	colour,	sound;	the	worlds	of	scientific	laws;	of	
mathematics,	logic,	ethics,	aesthetics;	of	common	beliefs	and	prejudices;	of	supernatural	
beliefs,	religion	or	fictions;	of	individual	opinion;	or	of	madness	or	vagary.	Our	
categorization,	immediate	or	delayed,	is	dependent	upon	our	current	perspective	and	point	
of	view.	A	fact	we	may	label	as	fiction	can	operate	as	true	within	a	proposition	or	an	
imagined	scenario.	The	imagining	of	a	horse	with	wings	works	in	the	context	of	the	legend	
of	Pegasus	but	not	in	relation	to	the	existent	horse	living	in	the	stable.	Wings	are	true	in	
relation	to	the	particular	world	to	which	they	refer.	
	
The	participant	has	varying	relations	to	these	contexts.	The	sociocultural	mores	and	
behaviourial	norms	of	the	museum	are	reassigned	by	the	expectations	of	game	play.	
Answering	the	phone,	listening	and	following	directions	are	enacted	as	part	of	the	story.	
Simply	walking	through	the	museum	becomes	a	performance.	
	
Recorded	sound,	movement	and	attention-focusing	techniques	mediate	participants’	
relations	to	the	environmental	and	narrative	contexts.	Vocal	suggestions	encourage	
																																																						4	Landscape	with	Figures	c.	1650	Salomon	van	Ruysdael.	
concentration	on	the	face	appearing	on	the	phone	screen	and	guide	the	imaginative	
‘transition’	into	the	world	of	the	painting.	In	the	present	tense,	with	minimal	description,	
simple	sentences	address	the	listener	in	the	second	person,	drawing	upon	structure	of	
hypnotic	inductions	(Weitzenhoffer	and	Hilgard	1999).	Binaural	sound	naturalistically	
depicts	the	traversing	of	people	and	animals	within	the	landscape	painting	that	surrounds	
Figure	2:	Whittaker,	E.	&	Brocklehurst,	J.	R.	(2013),	‘The	Lost	Index	No.1.	–	Landscape	with	
Figures,	Version	1.0’	[iOS	Application]	the	listener.	While	attention	is	focused	on	the	
narrative	or	the	painting,	thoughts	of	incongruity	with	the	gallery	may	be	deferred.	What	
we	take	to	be	veridical	or	describe	as	imaginary	can	be	vague	or	distinct.	When	slippages	of	
relations	to	context	occur,	what	is	talked	of	as	real	and	as	imagined	may	become	
ambiguous	or	confused.	Objective	and	subjective	spaces	flip	and	interpenetrate,	but	
the	imagined	will	not	function	in	the	real	world.	
	
‘I	took	my	earphones	out,	I	just	couldn’t	work	out	where	the	sound	of	the	
baby	was	coming	from’.	‘It	really	felt	like	I	was	being	watched’.	‘I	heard	
footsteps	coming	up	behind	me	and	thought	there	was	someone	there’.	
	
	
Figure	2:	Whittaker,	E.	&	Brocklehurst,	J.	R.	(2013),	‘The	Lost	Index	No.1.	–	
Landscape	with	Figures’,	Version	1.0’	[iOS	Application].	
	
Some	facts	are	true	only	within	the	story,	that	you	are	a	‘human	drive’,	that	there	exists	a	
church	interior,	box	and	contents,	but	they	are	also	potential	actually	imagined	events.	
James’	assertion	that	beliefs	occur	in-action	allows	for	the	movement	between	these	
contexts	to	be	fluid.	Experientially	worlds	are	nested	within	one	another	with	truth-values	
varyingly	assigned.	It	is	our	particular	contextual	relation	to	these	spaces	that	affects	
whether	we	take	them	to	be	real	or	imagined.	
	
	
	
Figure	3:	Whittaker,	E.	&	Brocklehurst,	J.	R.	(2013),	‘The	Lost	Index	No.1.	–	
Landscape	with	Figures,	Version	1.0’	[iOS	Application].	
	
The	painting	has	a	dual	function	as	a	theatrical	prop	within	the	narrative	and	as	an	aide-
memoire	in	the	memory	game,	that	functions	as	‘magical’	object	rather	than	a	literal	
doorway	to	the	outdoors.	To	enter	the	tower	requires	departing	from	the	surface	of	the	
painting;	only	sounds	depict	the	imaginary	interior.	Events	preceding	the	present	moment	
frame	the	experience	as	a	story.	Truth	is	a	value	in	experience.	Our	beliefs	about	the	world	
are	mostly	unverified	but	hang	together	in	a	concatenated	structure,	from	one	to	another	
occurring	in-action.	
	
Conclusion	
The	experienceable	environment	of	locative	narrative	plays	with	the	multistability	of	
meaning	between	terms,	in	a	reciprocal	adoption	of	the	vocabulary	of	perceptual	multi-
stability.	Directing	and	misdirecting	attention,	steering	emotion	and	guiding	interpretation	
can	defer	classification	of	fictional	places,	as	real	or	imagined,	keeping	knowing	in	transit.	
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